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Firm Productivity as 
an Engine of Saving
Saving rates are relatively low in Latin America and the Caribbean, as is 
productivity growth. Are these two facts related? Much of this book has 
argued that indeed, a relationship exists and that the direction of causal-
ity runs from savings to productivity, via investment. Low saving rates 
constrain investment in vital infrastructure such as roads, ports, and tele-
communications, which in turn takes its toll on the growth of aggregate 
total factor productivity (TFP). Without the necessary infrastructure, firms 
cannot be fully efficient in the production process. Thus, low saving rates 
impede productivity growth and result in poor economic performance.
However, a second channel relates saving decisions to productivity 
growth and runs in the opposite direction. This chapter advances—and, 
more importantly, quantitatively assesses—the idea that productivity 
growth is not only a fundamental driver of long-run economic growth 
but, crucially, that it also constitutes an important determinant of sav-
ing decisions.
How does this connection from productivity to savings work? Essen-
tially, it’s through incentives. Individuals respond to incentives that convince 
them to postpone consumption today in order to save more and increase 
their well-being tomorrow. Economies with low TFP growth tend to be 
economies in which returns to investments are low. Faced with this pros-
pect, firms have little incentive to invest—and households to save. Thus, 
saving rates will be low, too. In this way, low TFP growth, by providing 
weaker incentives to save, could be another determinant of the low sav-
ing rates observed in the region. The first half of this chapter explores the 
underlying mechanisms behind this idea, provides empirical evidence in 
favor of it, and quantifies the mechanism in some Latin American countries.
This causal link from TFP growth to savings is mediated by the finan-
cial system. Aggregate TFP is a weighted average of the productivity 




investment and hire more labor is an economy with high aggregate 
TFP growth. In order to invest, however, firms need access to financial 
markets. If instead, financial frictions constrain firms, some produc-
tive entrepreneurs may have to stay small until they can save enough 
to expand. Building up savings takes time; therefore, this process slows 
down aggregate productivity growth. The second part of the chapter 
looks at the distribution of private savings in the economy and at the 
behavior of firm saving in search of evidence that financial frictions dis-
tort the incentives to save in the region.
From Japan to the World: The Empirical Link between TFP and 
Savings
The role of productivity growth as an engine for saving has been well 
documented in the case of Japan in the 20th century. Chen, İmrohoroğlu, 
and İmrohoroğlu (2006) showed that the aggregate productivity growth 
between 1956 and 2000 in Japan explained most of the changes that 
took place in the country’s saving rate during this period.
While the Japanese story is compelling, the real question is whether 
this pattern is apparent elsewhere around the world and at other points in 
time. An examination of the data contained in the Penn World Tables, an 
annual panel of 167 countries spanning the 1950 to 2011 period, provides 
further evidence of the relationship between saving and TFP growth. 
Focusing on separate episodes of surges in the saving rate strengthens 
the case even more.1
Episodes of high TFP growth have gone hand in hand with increases 
in saving rates. Considering 15 episodes of significant, sustained TFP 
growth; 11 of the 15 were accompanied by an increase in the saving rate 
as well. Panel a of Figure 10.1 illustrates this phenomenon by plotting 
TFP, real output per capita, and the saving rate during these episodes. 
Fifteen years later, on average, TFP had nearly doubled, output per 
capita had multiplied by a factor of 2.6, and the saving rate had nearly 
doubled from around 12 percent to 22 percent. Importantly, the increase 
in the saving rate does not share the same timing as the other two vari-
ables, nor does it follow the same smooth path. Instead, the upturn in 
the saving rate occurs five years after the episode of TFP growth began.
While panel a supports the hypothesis that productivity can be an 
important determinant of savings, it does not imply that it is the only 
one. Panel b confirms a positive relationship between the two variables: 
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on average, episodes in which TFP increased the most also enjoyed the 
greatest increases in the saving rate. Importantly, though, panel b also 
reveals that increases in TFP are not the only determinant of savings, nor 
are they a sufficient condition for boosting the saving rate. In four of the 15 
episodes of significant TFP growth identified, the saving rate decreased.
Figure 10.1 Episodes of Surges in TFP











b. Episodes of TFP Surges: 











































c. Episodes of TFP Surges: Changes in the
    Saving Rate and Initial Saving Rate
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Source: Authors’ calculations and Penn World Tables. 
Note: In panel a, numbers reported are averages across episodes. TFP and real GDP per capita are 
normalized to be 1 in the first year of the episode. The horizontal axis represents the years since 
each episode started. For a list of individual episodes and for methodological details for defining 
them, see Busso, Fernández, and Tamayo (2016). Panels b and c plot the change in the saving rate 
during the TFP episode against the change in (log) TFP and the initial rate at the beginning of each 
of the 15 episodes identified, respectively. The adjusted R-squared of the simple linear regression in 
panel b is 0.31 and the positive slope has a coefficient of 1.05 with a p-value of 0.018. The adjusted 
R-squared of the simple linear regression in panel c is 0.82 and the negative slope has a coefficient 
of –0.84 with a p-value of 0.001. TFP = total factor productivity.
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Lastly, panel c presents the change in the saving rate in each episode 
against the level of the saving rate observed at the beginning of each epi-
sode. It reveals a strong negative relationship between the two variables: 
TFP episodes in which the change in the saving rate increased the most 
also had a lower saving rate at the beginning of the episode. The four epi-
sodes where the saving rate decreased when TFP surged were those with 
a relatively high saving rate to begin with—above 20 percent.
Another finding is that not all surges in saving rates end up boost-
ing output per capita. Whether a saving rate surge is accompanied by 
increases in output per capita appears to be related to whether or not 
TFP increases. This relationship is illustrated in panels a and b of Figure 
10.2, in which 22 episodes of large and sustained increases in the sav-
ing rate are analyzed. The episodes are divided into those in which TFP 
increased by less than 10 percent within a decade (panel a), and those 
in which it increased by at least that (panel b). In the episodes of saving 
surges characterized by high TFP growth, the saving rate tripled from 10 
percent to almost 30 percent within 15 years, while TFP and income per 
capita increased by a factor of 1.4 and 1.2, respectively. By contrast, in 
episodes of saving surges characterized by low TFP growth, this variable 
essentially stagnated alongside income per capita.
This analysis teaches an important lesson: if saving and productivity 
can foster investment and growth, they should not be studied in isolation. 
The facts indicate that productivity growth is another important variable 
when trying to understand the behavior of saving and its contribution to 
economic growth and well-being. This conclusion is consistent with two 
empirically documented findings about Latin America: its low saving rates 
(see Chapter 2) and its persistently low productivity growth (Pagés, 2010).
Incentives to Save
Why do saving decisions depend on investment returns? The mecha-
nism can be understood within the framework of the neoclassical growth 
model. It has two key building blocks. First, households decide how much 
to consume and how many hours to work in order to maximize their life-
time well-being. Second, firms combine capital and labor with varying 
degrees of technical efficiency (productivity). When capital is relatively 
scarce, firms will want to invest more, driving up the return to investment. 
Higher investment returns are then passed on to households, induc-
ing them to postpone consumption and increase saving. Thus, saving 
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decisions are determined largely by the returns to investment, which in 
turn depend on several factors. One of these factors is TFP growth.
Consider the case in which individuals in an economy expect 
higher productivity growth. This implies that they will be able to 
extract increasingly larger amounts of output from each unit of capi-
tal, effectively increasing investment returns. In this case, individuals 
will postpone consumption today in order to save, invest, and reap the 

































































b. Episodes of Savings Surges with High TFP Growth
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Source: Penn World Tables and authors’ calculations.
Note: Numbers reported are averages across 22 episodes of saving rate surges. TFP and real GDP 
per capita are normalized to be 1 in the first year of the episode. The horizontal axis represents 
the years since each episode started. Panel a plots averages across 10 episodes in which TFP in-
creased less than 10 percent within a decade. Panel b plots the remaining 12 episodes in which TFP 
increased by more than that. TFP = total factor productivity.
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benefits of the increase in productivity when it comes. The economy’s 
saving rate would increase above the level where it would otherwise 
have been.2 In addition to productivity, other factors may also affect 
returns to investment and saving behavior. First, higher depreciation of 
capital can reduce the net return of investing because a larger fraction 
of the capital invested is lost. Second, government taxation of capital 
income may reduce incentives to save as it reduces after-tax returns. 
Third, higher government consumption can also be an important drag 
on the resources available for saving. Lastly, higher population growth 
requires larger saving efforts in the long run. The relative importance 
of TFP growth as an engine for saving vis-à-vis these other factors is 
an open question. The next section quantifies how much each of these 
forces contributes to explaining the saving rate in three case studies, 
two of them from Latin America.
Quantifying the Link from Productivity to Saving
To quantify the impact of productivity growth on saving, Chen, İmrohoroğlu, 
and İmrohoroğlu (2006) use a version of the model described above, fit-
ted to Japanese data. Saving rates are simulated feeding the model with 
the observed dynamics of TFP growth, as well as the other driving forces 
that can affect investment returns, namely, population growth, effective 
rates of capital taxation, and government consumption. The results from 
this exercise are presented in Figure 10.3 under the label “model with four 
driving forces.” In addition, the figure presents two other simulated sav-
ing rates. One of these uses only the series of TFP growth and capital 
tax rates, leaving government spending and population growth constant 
(“model with TFP and taxes”). Finally, under the label “model with TFP,” 
only the TFP growth series is used to simulate the saving rate, while keep-
ing the remaining three forces constant. The main conclusion is that the 
simulated saving rate, using only the observed growth in productivity, 
properly tracks the evolution of Japan’s observed saving rate.
Does this result hold in Latin America too? To answer this question, 
the model is fitted to Mexico and Chile, much as it was to Japan. These 
countries provide examples in the region of two contrasting experiences 
of productivity growth and saving rate dynamics. In Chile and Mexico, 
productivity suddenly rose and fell around the early-1980s “debt crisis.”3 
From the mid-1980s on, both productivity growth and the saving rate 
recovered in Chile but failed to do so in Mexico.
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In addition to actual TFP growth, the model is fed with tax rates, 
government consumption, and population growth, first jointly and then 
sequentially. The simulated saving rates for three different scenarios (i.e., 
the same as in the case of Japan) are reported in panels b and c of Figure 
10.3, along with the actual saving rates. A few important observations 
emerge from the exercise.











































































Data Model with TFP and taxes







































Source: Authors’ calculations and Chen, İmrohoroğlu, and İmrohoroğlu (2006).
Note: For Mexico, the parameterization of the model closely follows Kehoe and Meza (2011), who 
studied Mexico’s growth experience during the post-war era. “model with four driving forces” = TFP 
growth, population growth, government consumption and a tax rate of 53 percent for 1970–88 and 
22 percent thereafter. “model with TFP and tax reform” = government consumption and popula-
tion growth at their sample averages but includes the 1987 “tax reform”. “model with TFP” uses the 
pre-reform tax rate (of 55 percent) for the entire period. The rationale for including a significant 
drop in the tax rate comes from Mexico’s major corporate tax reform in 1987 (Urzúa, 1993). In the 
case of Chile, the parameterization of the model closely follows Bergoeing et al. (2002). Given the 
lack of reliable data, capital tax rates were set at 55 percent between 1960 and 1987 and 12 percent 
thereafter (Bergoeing et al., 2002). Hsieh and Parker (2007) presented compelling evidence that 
corporate tax rates were lowered by these approximate magnitudes around 1986–87.
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First, in the case of Mexico, TFP growth and capital tax rates are 
able to track the actual saving rate fairly well. In particular, the model 
with only these two driving forces (“model with TFP and tax reform”) 
is able to account for the rise and fall in the saving rate around the time 
of the debt crisis and for its subsequent stagnation.4 Second, while 
productivity growth helps account for the dynamics of the saving rates 
throughout this period, capital tax rates played an important role in 
explaining the saving rates level in the aftermath of the debt crisis. In 
the model, capital tax rates serve as a proxy for the investment distor-
tions in the economy. The results show that both TFP growth and these 
other investment distortions are required to track the evolution of the 
saving rate in Mexico.
In the case of Chile, the model predicts an increase and then a dra-
matic drop in the saving rate around the time of the debt crisis in the 
early 1980s. The series labeled “model with four driving forces” shows 
that the simulated saving rate can reproduce the major trends in the 
Chilean saving rate, perhaps even better than for Mexico. In sharp con-
trast to the Mexican case, in Chile, the saving rate climbed steadily in 
the years after the crisis and throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. To 
determine the main driver of this increase, Figure 10.3 compares three 
saving rates produced by the model. The results are that the strong 
TFP growth following the crisis of the early 1980s was the main driving 
force behind the observed saving behavior.5 Again, capital taxes (i.e., 
a proxy for broader investment distortions) are important in deter-
mining the level of the saving rate, perhaps to a larger extent than for 
Mexico.
To sum up, this analysis uncovers three main lessons. First, as in 
Japan, the dynamics of productivity help to explain the broad trends 
in the saving rates of Mexico and Chile. Second, the simulations for 
both Chile and Mexico support the hypothesis that saving incentives 
(i.e., investment returns) matter for saving decisions. Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, other factors (i.e., investment distortions) play 
a more central role in explaining the level of saving rates in Chile and 
Mexico than in Japan. In the real world, these distortions go beyond 
capital taxes; they also include, for example, distortions in financial 
markets that raise the cost of credit for firms. There is plenty of evi-
dence that investment distortions are pervasive in the region and 
should therefore command the attention of policymakers interested 
in boosting saving.
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The Fine Print
Even though the mechanism described above can help rationalize a 
causal link from productivity growth to saving, it has two potential limita-
tions. 6 First, the model assumes a closed economy setting. Productivity 
growth would matter less for national saving if countries could perfectly 
substitute national saving for foreign saving. In a small open economy, 
foreign capital should flow in with higher productivity growth in search of 
the higher returns to investment. Hence, investment would be decoupled 
from national saving. However, evidence of this decoupling has been elu-
sive (see Feldstein and Horioka [1980], and Chapters 4 and 5).7
Second, a recent analysis finds that capital flows from rich to poor 
countries are not only low (as argued by Lucas, 1990), but their alloca-
tion across developing countries is at odds with the one predicted by the 
open economy version of the model described above (Gourinchas and 
Jeanne, 2013). Not only is the strong positive correlation between pro-
ductivity growth and foreign capital inflows not observed in the data, 
in fact there is a negative correlation between the two—a phenomenon 
known as the “allocation puzzle.”
Why doesn’t capital flow to countries with higher productivity 
growth to take advantage of the higher returns to investment? Gourin-
chas and Jeanne (2013) argue that since individuals can save not only 
through physical capital but also through financial assets abroad, taxa-
tion of returns to physical capital offers an incomplete explanation to 
the pattern of national saving and capital flows. Instead, large distor-
tions to the accumulation of wealth—saving—rather than to its allocation 
(between domestic physical capital and foreign financial assets) are 
responsible for the particular pattern of net capital flows in Latin Amer-
ica (as opposed to, say, countries in Asia that actually subsidize saving). 
This result validates the idea that in a closed economy a tax on capital 
income acts also as a tax on saving. It also reaffirms the importance of 
examining the investment distortions faced by firms in Latin America, an 
exercise undertaken in the second half of this chapter.
In addition, the model assumes that all firms are homogeneous. 
This entails studying consumption, labor, and saving decisions from 
the standpoint of a representative agent (i.e., without distinguish-
ing between firms or households). In particular, who carries out saving 
decisions is immaterial in the sense that the same results are achieved 
regardless of whether firms or households save. Acknowledging that 
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agents vary along several dimensions—for instance in terms of wealth 
and productivity—has two important implications. First, aggregate pro-
ductivity growth now results from combining the levels and growth rates 
of individual productivities of all operating firms at a given point in time 
(see Busso, Fernández, and Tamayo, 2016). Second, the efficient allo-
cation of capital requires institutional arrangements, such as financial 
markets, for savings to flow across firms and sectors toward their most 
productive use. That is, with heterogeneous agents, who saves and how 
much matters.8 For this reason, the rest of this chapter focuses on het-
erogeneity and distortions in saving–investment decisions.
Zooming in on Firms’ Saving Decisions
Since entrepreneurs, by nature, vary in terms of their ideas and abilities 
to organize production, firms in the economy have different levels of 
productivity. Who gets to produce, and how much, matters for aggre-
gate productivity. If a highly productive entrepreneur faces numerous 
obstacles in financial markets (also known as financial frictions) and thus 
cannot obtain the credit necessary to fund projects, the firm’s growth 
will be constrained dramatically, as it will need time to accumulate inter-
nal funds. This results in lower long-run aggregate productivity growth.
As discussed earlier, low productivity growth provides few incen-
tives for the economy to save. However, while financial frictions hinder 
productivity growth and thus result in lower aggregate saving, they 
nonetheless induce productive firms to save (i.e., accumulate internal 
funds) in order to overcome the lack of access to credit markets; there-
fore, paradoxically, financial frictions result in a higher share of saving in 
the economy done by firms (rather than by households). Analyzing the 
distribution of private saving in the economy, as well as patterns of firm 
saving, provides evidence that financial frictions distort price signals and 
incentives to save.
Why do firms save?9 To begin with, firms must regularly meet cash 
needs for the ordinary course of business. Since it is costly to convert 
noncash financial assets regularly into cash for payments, firms need 
to hold cash to make those payments. Besides this transaction motive, 
there is a precautionary motive: businesses save so they can react more 
rapidly to adverse shocks or investment opportunities when access to 
capital markets is costly or takes time. Finally, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, firms save to finance current and future investment.
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In contrast to households, which decide to save to increase future 
consumption, firms decide how much to save and invest to maximize 
their profits based on the relative costs of internal versus external fund-
ing sources.
In an economy without any transaction, bankruptcy, or agency 
costs, without any distortionary taxes, with symmetric information, and 
with efficient markets, the capital structure of the firm would be irrel-
evant for the firm value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). In such an ideal 
economy, firms would have no reason to save. If they needed funds to 
build new plants, buy new machinery, or weather unexpected drops in 
sales or surges in expenses, they could borrow money from lenders and 
repay debts in the future. In such an economy, the cost of borrowing 
(the interest rate) would be the same as the cost of internal funds. In a 
world with symmetric information, banks, knowing everything that the 
firm does, would provide those resources if the firm were to find it prof-
itable in the long run; otherwise, the firm would not be willing to borrow 
money in the first place.
The real world, however, is littered with transaction, bankruptcy, and 
agency costs; there are distortionary taxes and information frictions; and 
markets can be inefficient. For the sake of simplicity, these impediments 
are referred to as “financial frictions.” These frictions make external 
financing relatively more costly than internal financing, thereby increas-
ing incentives for firms to save rather than borrow money from lenders. 
Information frictions can prevent firms that want to borrow money from 
finding willing lenders, for whom it is costly to determine the viability of 
investment projects. This raises the cost of external finance and encour-
ages firms to save. The so-called pecking order theory of finance (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984) predicts that based on firms’ relative cost, it is best for 
them to use their own savings first, then to use debt, and finally, as a last 
resort, to issue equity.
Thus, the share of private saving done by firms can be rather large 
in most economies. Figure 10.4 shows the share of business saving to 
total private saving computed using national account data (Bebczuk 
and Cavallo, 2016). It plots information for a subset of countries in Latin 
America for which data are available, and for three comparison regions/
countries: core Europe, the United States, and Germany. Businesses in 
all regions/countries under consideration are responsible for more than 
50 percent of private saving, including Latin America, where the share of 
private saving by firms is 68 percent.
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In most economies, the average firm funds a large proportion of its 
investment projects using its own saving. Firms in Latin America follow 
this norm, funding between 45 and 75 percent of their capital with their 
own savings (see Figure 10.5). Even in Germany, a country with a more 
developed financial system, the average firm finances 44 percent of its 
fixed assets with its own savings.10
Why do firms in certain economies seem to rely more heavily on their 
own savings to fund their capital stock? One likely explanation is that 
their financial systems are underdeveloped. Firms that face fewer bind-
ing financial constraints rely less on internal funds to finance their capital 
investment. They usually face less stringent collateral requirements 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005, 2008) and, given their 
size, are typically subject to less severe information asymmetries, result-
ing in multiple sources of funding (Diamond and verrecchia, 1991). Figure 
10.6 shows that the share of internal funds to finance capital declines with 
size; it is smaller for larger, less financially constrained firms.
Figure 10.7 utilizes a more direct measure by analyzing actual access 
to credit. In the scatter plot, each dot represents a country and size cat-
egory combination. This figure confirms that the greater the access to 
credit, the smaller the share of investment financed with saving.
Financial frictions seem to be a particularly acute problem in Latin 
American economies, where financial development is low. Fernández and 























Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bebczuk and Cavallo (2016).
Note: Latin America and the Caribbean refer to Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and Mexico. Europe refers to Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Data are for 2008–12. Private saving is the sum of household 
and corporate saving. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). See Busso, Fernán-
dez, and Tamayo (2016) for details. 
Note: Firm savings are defined as internal funds or retained earnings. 
Figure 10.5  Firms’ Financing with Their Own Savings, Germany and Select 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). See Busso, Fernán-
dez, and Tamayo (2016) for details. 
Note: Firm savings are defined as internal funds or retained earnings. LAC refers to Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
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Tamayo (forthcoming) survey the institutional causes of financial underde-
velopment and their effect on growth. They pay particular attention to the 
weak institutions in Latin America which result, for example, in poor credi-
tor protection. Importantly, low financial development could have been a 
bottleneck in the process of resource reallocation following the large-scale 
reforms implemented by many countries in the region in previous decades.
Firm Saving: A Way Out for Productive Firms
Firm saving is an imperfect remedy for financial underdevelopment. 
Saving can help firms overcome financial frictions so they can grow. 
In this way, saving is related to firm-level productivity and aggregate 
TFP growth. Firms usually start on a small scale with ideas, low levels 
of capital, and only a few employees. Small firms learn to organize their 
business and practices, and with time, realize whether they are produc-
tive or not. Not all firms, however, are born equal.
Small, unproductive firms have low marginal products of capital and 
labor. They have no reason, need, or ability to expand. Depending on 
how much competition and price distortion they face in their sector, they 
can survive with low levels of capital. Consequently, they find no need to 
save much. Their probability of exiting the market in which they operate 
in any given year is high (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996). In Latin 
Figure 10.7 Fixed Assets Financed with Savings and Access to Credit



































































Source: Authors’ elaboration based on World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). For a list of countries 
and other details, see Busso, Fernández, and Tamayo (2016). 
Note: Each dot represents a country-bin size combination.
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America, these firms are usually small, informal, family-owned enter-
prises that survive mainly because distortions allow them to pay lower 
input costs or to charge higher prices.
For small, productive firms, however, it is optimal to grow by hir-
ing more labor and acquiring more physical capital. This process of firm 
growth usually requires long-term investments in the form of new and 
larger plants that imply substantial resources, and which pay off only 
gradually over time. Even if the sunk cost of investment is tiny relative 
to the potential stream of future profits, the firm could expect costs to 
be very high compared to the meager profits from a small plant. Saving 
for future investments could be the only way to grow—and this process 
could take a long time.
Therefore, financial frictions have implications both for aggregate 
TFP growth and for the level and type of saving done in the economy. To 
understand why, firms can be classified into three types: small, unpro-
ductive firms that remain small or eventually exit the market; small, 
productive firms that would like to grow but cannot because of financial 
constraints; and firms that have already jumped to a larger scale.
In an economy with few financial frictions, small, productive firms 
can borrow substantially to upgrade their plants. Large firms invest to 
maintain their physical capital. Small, productive firms grow fast, increas-
ing demand for capital and labor, which translates into higher wages and 
returns to capital accumulation. These price changes have many implica-
tions. First, higher wages eventually convince some small, unproductive 
entrepreneurs to close their plants and become wage employees. There-
fore, such an economy has a significant share of large firms. Because 
productive firms grow fast, the share of small, productive firms is mini-
mal, and there are almost no small, unproductive firms. Since the total 
factor productivity of the economy is a weighted sum of the productiv-
ity of individual firms, this economy enjoys higher aggregate productivity 
growth. Moreover, higher (equilibrium) investment returns translate into 
higher incentives for individuals to save. Aggregate savings are higher too.
Now consider an economy with high financial frictions, assuming 
the same distribution of firm productivities as before. Small, productive 
firms cannot borrow to upgrade plants and must save a larger portion 
of the required resources; therefore, they remain small longer. They do 
not increase labor demand, and wages remain low. They also do not 
increase demand for capital, and returns to capital accumulation remain 
low, as well. In such an economy, the mix of firms is very different. There 
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is a smaller share of large firms, a larger share of small, productive firms 
that want to grow but cannot, and a larger share of small, unproductive 
firms. Aggregate productivity growth and aggregate savings are lower. 
The ratio of firm-to-household savings is higher because saving is the 
only way for firms to upgrade their plants. In that sense, excessive firm 
saving signals an underdeveloped financial system.
On average, more productive firms tend to save more. More impor-
tantly, productive firms without access to credit tend to save more than 
unproductive firms (see Busso, Fernández, and Tamayo, 2016). This cor-
relation is even stronger among firms that applied for credit but did not 
secure it yet. In other words, holding the size distribution constant, more 
productive firms tend to save more. They require capital to grow but 
cannot access credit.
There is a relatively large, recent literature that formally models the 
relationships between financial frictions, firm productivity, saving, and 
aggregate TFP growth along the lines outlined above. For example, Mid-
rigan and xu (2014) use firm-level data to calibrate a model to South 
Korea (an economy with low financial frictions), China, and Colombia 
(two economies with high financial frictions). They show that without 
firm saving, the costs of financial underdevelopment would be much 
greater. Financial imperfections have a negative effect on the number 
and scale of producers that operate in the economy. The ability of firm 
saving to allow small firms to grow is more limited, precisely because 
their saving capacity is low.11
A Productive Approach to Policy
Two general policy implications are clear. First, when considering policies 
to promote savings, policymakers should not overlook economic reforms 
that foster productivity growth. It is no coincidence that episodes of fast 
TFP growth have been accompanied by increases in the aggregate sav-
ing rate and GDP growth, while episodes of savings growth without TFP 
growth did not lead to GDP growth. There is a reinforcing link whereby 
more saving can increase growth only if the additional savings is invested 
in projects that generate high returns and thus enhance productiv-
ity growth. Unfortunately, productivity growth has been elusive in Latin 
America. Policies to promote productivity growth in the region, including 
those aimed at improving the allocation of resources, promoting competi-
tion, and fostering firm innovation, are discussed in Pagés (2010).
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Second, since aggregate productivity is a weighted average of 
the productivity of individual firms, which firms get to produce and 
how much affects the resulting aggregate productivity growth, and is 
therefore crucial for generating saving incentives. In particular, severe 
financial market frictions slow down the dynamics of productive firms 
significantly, as these firms need to save before they can grow. While 
this allows productive firms to save more, it also results in losses due 
to resource misallocation, lower TFP growth, and lower aggregate sav-
ing rates. Moreover, labor market and product market distortions might 
interact with the distortions generated by financial frictions and exac-
erbate the productivity cost of financial underdevelopment (these 
interactions are explored in Box 10.1).
Thus, policies to address the underlying causes of financial frictions 
(which is the focus of the next chapter) can help improve capital alloca-
tion, thereby increasing investment returns and saving incentives. In the 
search for more and, particularly, better saving in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, alleviating financial frictions can have a quantitatively signifi-
cant impact.
BOX 10.1. FIRM SAVING, INFORMALITY, DISTORTIONS, AND MISALLOCATION
Latin America has a large number of small, informal, and unproductive firms 
that face lower costs of inputs or higher product prices because taxes and 
regulations are not properly enforced (Busso, Fazio, and Levy, 2012). By dis-
torting prices, informality can provide incentives for unproductive firms to 
grow, even when they would not do so otherwise. The economic inefficiencies 
generated by these labor and tax distortions can be amplified by the ability 
of firms to save.
Consider a household that owns a small and relatively unproductive firm, 
and thus extracts little output from labor and capital. Suppose only labor mar-
ket distortions exist. This informal firm is less productive than a formal firm in 
the same sector; it does not pay labor taxes, and therefore it has lower labor 
costs. For simplicity, assume capital is a complement to labor. Both firms hire 
labor and capital until the marginal products of these inputs equal their cost. 
The informal firm, facing lower labor costs, would hire more labor and capital 
than if resources were efficiently allocated. In an economy with financial fric-
tions, the informal firm is likely to face higher external funding costs than the 
formal firm. These financial market distortions lessen the misallocation caused 
by labor market distortions.
This argument ignores the fact that entrepreneurs can overcome financial 
constraints through saving. If there were financial frictions and no labor mar-
(continued on next page)
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ket distortions, then small, informal, unproductive firms would have no reason 
to save because it would not be optimal for them to grow. However, with labor 
market distortions, their labor costs would decline, and it could potentially be 
in the interest of these firms to save in order to acquire capital (which comple-
ments labor).
Thus, in a context of preexisting distortions, firm saving can create an ad-
ditional inefficiency by allowing small, informal firms to work around financial 
restrictions, and therefore capture more resources (labor and capital) than 
they would otherwise. Without those preexisting labor distortions, this ineffi-
cient cost of savings would not be a factor. Increasing aggregate productivity 
by reducing misallocation requires reducing preexisting distortions rather 
than preventing firms from saving, which is probably not feasible.
The additional misallocation cost of firm saving depends critically on the 
actual amount of capital allocated to small, informal, and unproductive firms 
and on the shape of these firms’ demand for capital. The evidence suggests 
that this is not a first-order problem, however. In order to estimate the size dis-
tribution of capital in the economy, an economic census that covers all firms 
in that economy is needed. The only country in the region that has such data 
is Mexico. Busso, Fazio, and Levy (2012) use Mexico’s 2008 economic census 
and find that 90 percent of establishments have fewer than five employees 
and employ 38 percent of the economy’s labor, but only 13 percent of the 
capital. On the other hand, larger firms with 50 or more employees employ 
more than 70 percent of the economy’s available capital. Data from the Na-
tional Survey of Microenterprises for Mexico confirm that small firms do not 
use much capital: the median small firm has a stock value of capital of less 
than US$1,000. This is consistent with experimental evidence that finds that 
small, informal firms have a marginal product of capital that is very high for 
very low levels of capital (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2008) and de-
creases sharply as firms accumulate small amounts of capital (McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2006).
Thus, even though labor and tax distortions are large and can misallocate 
resources—thereby exacting a high toll on productivity in developing coun-
tries (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008)—they do not 
seem to increase because of firm saving.
BOX 10.1. (continued)
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Notes
1 See Busso, Fernández, and Tamayo (2016) for further details about 
the data and methodology used in this section, the specific criteria 
used when identifying these episodes, as well as a complete list of 
them.
2 Busso, Fernández, and Tamayo (2016), which serves as an online 
appendix to this chapter, presents a full mathematical description of 
how the neoclassical model works, as well as a simulation following an 
expected future increase in productivity.
3 Both Mexico and Chile suffered severe debt and financial crises during 
this time that manifested in collapses of productivity, which the exer-
cise is going to take as given. The main goal is to assess how these 
events determined the saving decisions during this period.
4 However, when compared to model performance in Chen, İmrohoroğlu, 
and İmrohoroğlu (2006), the model appears to miss some short-
run dynamics. This is expected, given the superior data with which 
Chen, İmrohoroğlu, and İmrohoroğlu (2006) were able to work. These 
authors had complete times series of capital tax rates and carefully 
constructed depreciation series from Hayashi (1989).
5 Cerda et al. (2015) show that a precipitous decline in tax rates on 
retained earnings (from close to 50 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 
1988) provided plenty of saving incentives in those years.
6 There are also alternative explanations for the link between produc-
tivity growth and savings. In fact, Aghion et al. (2009) postulate 
that low productivity itself may be reinforced by low national sav-
ing rates. According to their model, growth in poor countries results 
from innovations that allow local sectors to catch up with the technol-
ogy frontier. However, doing so requires the cooperation of a foreign 
investor who is familiar with the frontier and a domestic entrepreneur 
who is familiar with the local conditions. National savings allow the 
local entrepreneur to take an equity stake in this cooperative venture, 
thus mitigating potential agency problems.
7 Chapter 5 provides evidence about the imperfect substitutability 
between national and foreign saving. In addition, de la Torre and Ize 
(2015), who argued for the presence of transaction costs that would 
make foreign and domestic savings imperfect substitutes, have 
recently confirmed this for Latin America.
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8 Notice that, with perfect financial markets, heterogeneity has no real 
effect since all firms could freely borrow to quickly attain their opti-
mal size. Likewise, imperfect financial markets without heterogeneity 
revert back to the neoclassical world (see Busso, Fernández, and 
Tamayo, 2016).
9 See Bebczuk and Cavallo (2016) for a complete treatment of this issue.
10 This result is similar to the one presented in Kawamura and Ronconi 
(2015). The main difference is that in this chapter, data from the WBES 
is reweighted in order to keep constant the size distribution of firms 
across countries. This is done to prevent differences in the sampling 
frame of each country from affecting the results. See Busso, Fernán-
dez, and Tamayo (2016) for more details.
11 Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) use a similar model to explain the rela-
tionship between aggregate total factor productivity and financial 
development across countries. They assume that after production, 
entrepreneurs could renege on borrowing contracts. This imperfect 
enforceability of contracts introduces a financial friction that distorts 
the allocation of capital across firms and their entry/exit decisions, 
reducing aggregate productivity growth. In their model, forward-look-
ing self-financing (i.e., saving) can alleviate the resulting misallocation. 
However, it is more difficult to self-finance on a larger scale with larger 
financing needs. Thus, large-scale sectors (such as manufacturing) 
are affected more by financial frictions than smaller-scale sectors 
(such as services). The variation in financial development explains 80 
percent of the difference in output per worker between Mexico and 
the United States.
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